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Recent research has shown that individuals are prepared to incur costs to punish non-
cooperators, even in one-shot interactions. However, why would people punish non-
cooperators with no apparent benefits for the punishers themselves? This behavior is
also known as altruistic punishment.When defection is discovered, an individual evalu-
ates this act as unfair,which could result in anger.We argue that althoughunfairness and
anger are often intertwined, it is primarily the experience of anger and not the percep-
tion of unfairness that produces altruistic punishment.We briefly present recent data in
line with the hypothesis that identifies anger as the underlying mechanism of altruistic
punishment. Furthermore, additional influences regarding the occurrence of altruistic
punishment, e.g., intentionality of the interaction partner, the role of satisfaction, and
individual differences, are discussed.
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Altruistic Punishment
Scholars from both biological and social sci-
ences face the long-standing problem of un-
derstanding the conditions required for the
emergence and maintenance of human coop-
eration. Unlike other organisms, people fre-
quently cooperate with genetically unrelated
strangers, with people they never meet again,
and when reputation gains are small or even
absent. This behavior is puzzling because such
cooperation can incur individual costs to con-
fer benefits on unrelated others. It cannot be
explained by mechanisms commonly used to
explain cooperative behavior in general, e.g.,
nepotistic motives associated with the theory
of kin selection and inclusive fitness,1 selfish
motives associated with theories of direct reci-
procity,2,3 indirect reciprocity based on repu-
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tation,4,5 and costly signaling.6 Recently it has
been suggested that altruistic punishment, that
is, people’s propensity to incur costs in order
to punish non-cooperators, might provide one
solution to this intriguing puzzle of human
cooperation.7–10 Altruistic punishmenta means
that individuals punish non-cooperators (i.e.,
free riders or defectors) even if this punishment
is costly (e.g., in terms of money, time, or ef-
fort) and yields no apparent benefits for the
punishers themselves.10 However, punishment
may well benefit future interaction partners of
the punishee if the punishee responds to the
punishment by increasing cooperation in fu-
ture interactions. Indeed, it has been shown
that people do engage in altruistic punishment
aSome scholars use the term costly punishment instead of altruistic pun-
ishment. Although the latter term is most often used in the literature, the
former is in our view more precise. One might argue whether altruistic
punishment, as described in the literature, is always truly altruistic. For
instance, punishment can be regarded as self-interested, despite its private
costs, if the punisher benefits from increased public good provision over
the long term37 or if, as we argue, the punisher derives satisfaction from
imposing punishment.
Values, Empathy, and Fairness across Social Barriers: Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1167: 190–196 (2009).
doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x c© 2009 New York Academy of Sciences.
190
Seip et al.: Role of Anger and Unfairness in Altruistic Punishment 191
even in one-shot interactions and that coop-
eration flourishes if altruistic punishment is
possible and breaks down if it is ruled out.9,10
Moreover, anthropological research has yielded
results from 15 populations on five continents
showing that all studied populations engaged
in altruistic punishment and that its magni-
tude covaries positively with altruistic behav-
ior across these populations.11 However, care
should be taken in generalizing these find-
ings because recent research showed impor-
tant cross-societal differences in punishment
and cooperation;12 in some societies cooper-
ation did not increase upon presence of pun-
ishment. Punishment seems only to enhance
cooperation in the presence of strong social
norms.
Although altruistic punishment may repre-
sent an attractive and plausible solution for the
puzzle of human cooperation (at least in strong
social norm societies), it also creates a new puz-
zle that calls for further theoretical and em-
pirical investigation. Why would people incur
costs to punish free riders and in this way pro-
vide benefits to (unrelated) others in the first
place? Taking an inconsiderate clod to task for
butting into line in front of you makes perfect
sense, but how does one explain the person who
bawls out a stranger for butting into line behind
him? Because punishment is costly for the indi-
vidual but beneficial for the group as a whole,
it creates a second-order social dilemma.13 Ev-
eryone in a population will be better off if non-
cooperation (and norm violation) is deterred,
but nobody seems to have an individual incen-
tive to bear the costs of punishing defectors. In
the present article we argue that to solve this
dilemma, at least partly, a closer look at the
emotional processes underlying altruistic pun-
ishment is needed.
Emotions and Altruistic Punishment
Emotions have evolved to prepare us to ad-
dress important events in our lives adaptively.
The experience of an emotion can be con-
sidered as a felt action tendency14,15 but also
guides specific action and information process-
ing tendencies.16 For example, fear can be char-
acterized by tendencies to avoid and prepare
for vigorous action and to carefully scrutinize
the surroundings for signs of actual threat. Pos-
itive affect, such as in happiness or joy, on the
other hand broadens our attention,17 evokes
playful behavior, and facilitates social inter-
action.18 In the case of anger, an approach
action tendency is initiated to remove the obsta-
cle (the situation is worth fighting for) accom-
panied by high alertness.14,19 In other words,
emotions exist for the regulation of oneself and
one’s behavior in relation to another person, an
event, or even an object.14,15,20 We argue that
emotions may contribute to an optimal solu-
tion for the individual as well as for the group
by evoking altruistic punishment and subse-
quent cooperation. The experience of anger
and subsequent punishment might be a way to
express anger, and at the same time pun-
ishment might be a way to communicate a
social norm, promoting cooperation in the
end.
In the present article we argue that spe-
cific emotions constitute the proximate mech-
anism underlying altruistic punishment. Emo-
tions can direct punishment behavior in spite of
demands of effort or other costs. More specif-
ically, we argue that the experience of anger
can provide “extra fuel” necessary for people
to punish free riders even if it is costly and does
not yield any material benefits. Theorists from
different disciplines have argued that anger can
be triggered by violations of reciprocity. If de-
fection is discovered, an individual appraises
this act as unfair and blameworthy and, conse-
quently, experiences anger toward the defec-
tor.21,22 Former research has already shown
that altruistic punishment in response to unfair
behavior is related to feelings of anger toward
the defector.10 In contrast, fair offers are re-
lated to feelings of happiness and activation in
the neural reward circuitry.23
If anger constitutes a proximate cause of
altruistic punishment, one would expect that
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anger will be more intense as the contributions
of free riders deviate further from average in-
vestments. This line of reasoning is supported
indirectly by research showing that unfair (low)
offers in economic games are accompanied by
an increase in arousal (a proximate for emo-
tion) that itself is correlated positively with the
subsequent rejection of these unfair offers.24
In this study by van ‘t Wout and colleagues,
no additional measures of anger were assessed,
unfortunately, therefore we consider this as in-
direct evidence. More indirect evidence for the
hypothesis that anger causes altruistic punish-
ment comes from recent (neuro) economic stud-
ies. Sanfey and colleagues25 showed, for exam-
ple, that unfair offers in the ultimatum game
elicited activity in the anterior insula, a brain
area that is also associated with anger. More-
over, they showed that this brain activity was
correlated with the subsequent decision to re-
ject the unfair offer (a proxy for altruistic pun-
ishment). No evidence was obtained, however,
regarding subjective feelings of anger that could
have led to rejections of unfair offers. Also, areas
associated with reward processing, such as the
orbitofrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens,
were activated (in men but not in women) upon
a cue indicating high shock to unfair players.
This activity even correlated with an expressed
desire for revenge and was accompanied by a
decrease in empathic neural response.26 Here it
is not clear, however, whether themenwere pre-
pared to incur costs to punish the unfair player;
there was also no direct measurement of the
perception of unfairness and anger. Therefore
these findings provide only indirect evidence
for the role of anger in altruistic punishment.
In summary, these studies suggest the in-
volvement of emotion and, more specifically,
anger in altruistic punishment. How exactly the
unfairness of the situation is related to anger
and subsequently to the use of altruistic pun-
ishment remains, however, open to question. In
the following paragraphs we provide additional
evidence and give a suggestion for the inter-
play between anger, unfairness, and altruistic
punishment.
Perception of Unfairness
and the Experience of Anger
One important and necessary component of
the experience of anger could be the percep-
tion of unfairness.27 We argue that although
unfairness and anger are often intertwined, it is
the experience of anger and not the perceived
unfairness that produces altruistic punishment.
In dealing with an unfair situation, the dynam-
ical interaction of cognitive-emotional systems
might result in two types of emotional control
processes (direct as well as indirect), as pro-
posed by Ochsner and colleagues,28 disentan-
gling anger on the one hand and perception
of unfairness on the other. The first process is
related to onset and experience of anger where
the context-appropriate emotional value of a
stimulus is evaluated, like the unfairness of an
offer. Consequently, actions based upon these
evaluations are selected, like the decision to
punish. This control process contains direct
reciprocal connections between ventral pre-
frontal cortex and orbitofrontal systems. The
second typemight be related only to the percep-
tion of unfairness.Here the association between
stimulus and emotional responses can explicitly
be described and reasoned about. This could
lead to an alternative evaluation of the event
and might modulate the direct emotional reac-
tion. The evaluation of unfairness might influ-
ence the occurrence of anger and punishment.
This second process involves dorsal prefrontal
systems that have few, if any, connections with
emotional appraisal systems.
Evidence that the perception of unfairness
is the result of explicit reasoning comes from a
study by Knoch and colleagues.29 Disruption
of the right, but not left, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) by transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (TMS) substantially reduced subjects’
willingness to reject their partners’ intention-
ally unfair offer. This suggests that subjects were
less able to resist the economic temptation to
accept these offers. In addition, upon applying
TMS, subjects accepted unfair offers almost
as quickly as fair offers, suggesting that, with
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disruption of DLPFC, self-interest impulses
have a stronger impact on behavior.29 Rejec-
tion of an unfair offer might, therefore, involve
a more controlled higher order process. These
findings suggest that punishment behavior is
related to perception of unfairness. We agree
with the importance of unfairness perception
in punishment behavior but we also argue that
it is not the perception that drives punishment
behavior but the experience of anger that trig-
gers altruistic punishment. Below we will de-
scribe some of our recent work that is in line
with our reasoning and that provides direct em-
pirical support for the primary role of anger in
altruistic punishment.
Anger as a Proximate Mechanism
for Altruistic Punishment
Pillutla and colleagues27 were the first to
study the relationship between the role of per-
ceived fairness and emotions in the decision
to either reject or accept unfair (low) offers.
They showed that anger in response to an
unfair offer was a better predictor of rejec-
tions than the perception of unfairness per se.
Results were only correlational, therefore no
statements could be made regarding the causal
relationship between anger and altruistic pun-
ishment. In addition, Pillutla and colleagues27
used the ultimatum game in which participants
only had the choice to accept or reject passively
an offer. We used a paradigm in which partic-
ipants could act directly toward the defector
with altruistic punishment. Since anger is re-
flected more by action, such as the tendency to
approach the defector,19 whereas there is not
at all an action tendency in the decision to ac-
cept or reject an offer, we think that altruistic
punishment can be better studied within a trust
paradigm than an ultimatum game.
In a series of three studies, we examined the
impact of both unfairness and anger on altruis-
tic punishment. In our first study we measured
participants’ reactions to a non-cooperator in
a sequential trust game. Results showed that
themore non-cooperation was perceived as un-
fair, the more anger it evoked and the more
punishment was given to the non-cooperator.
Importantly, follow-up analyses showed that
the impact of unfairness on punishment was
fully mediated by experienced anger. That is,
perceived unfairness elicits anger and, subse-
quently, this anger triggers punishment. These
results indicate that perceived unfairness per se
does not predict punishment but that punish-
ment is more reliably predicted by feelings of
anger.
In a second study we investigated the role
of anger in altruistic punishment. In this study
participants played a one-shot, three-person,
public good game 10 times. Results showed
that the lower the contribution of others, the
more angry participants felt and the harsher
they punished others. In line with our reason-
ing, follow-up analyses showed that the effect of
the contribution of others on imposed punish-
ment was fully mediated by experienced anger.
These results suggest again that punishment is
not triggered by the others’ contributions to
the public good but by people’s anger. Thus,
both studies indicate that anger and not the
perception of unfairness is a strong and reliable
predictor of altruistic punishment.
To further test whether it is primarily anger
that underlies altruistic punishment, we primed
participants with feelings of anger in our third
study. Half of the participants were asked to re-
call and describe an autobiographical episode
in which they experienced anger, whereas the
remaining half were asked to describe a nor-
mal day in their lives. After finishing this part
of the study, participants were told that they
would continue with an unrelated study. In this
second part they played six times a sequential
trust game with the possibility of punishment.
In half of these games they encountered a de-
fector and in the other half they encountered
a cooperator. Preliminary results by van Dijk,
Gallucci, Seip and Rotteveel showed that par-
ticipants primed with anger punished signifi-
cantly more than the participants that were not
primed with anger, providing further support
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for our hypothesis that anger specifically un-
derlies altruistic punishment.
Although there are important differences in
studies measuring rejection of offers and those
using more direct forms of punishment, to-
gether these studies indicate that experienced
anger is a more reliable predictor of altruistic
punishment than unfairness or defection per se.
What seems to matter in altruistic punishment
is not the extent to which others defect or how
unfair this defection is perceived but the extent
to which people experience anger.
Discussion and Future Directions
In the present article we argued that anger
constitutes a proximate mechanism for altru-
istic punishment. In a first attempt to lay
down the workings of anger and unfairness in
the initiation of altruistic punishment, we ar-
gue that the perception of unfairness can cause
anger but it is the experience of anger that re-
sults in altruistic punishment. Furthermore, we
have described some of our recent work that
supports the causal role of anger in altruistic
punishment.
In a recent studyHerrmann and colleagues12
introduced a new phenomenon in addition to
altruistic punishment, namely antisocial pun-
ishment (e.g., the sanctioning of people be-
having prosocially). This research shows that
individuals that have been punished in the
past for contributing too little might retaliate
against cooperators because they are the ones
who are most likely to punish the free-riding
low contributors. The authors suggest that at
least some people might not accept punish-
ment and therefore seek revenge. Wanting to
take revenge is an action tendency closely re-
lated to, if not originating from, anger.30 There-
fore, in our view, anger might not only un-
derlie altruistic punishment but also antisocial
punishment.
In addition to anger, other emotions could
also play a role in altruistic punishment. For ex-
ample, experienced or anticipated satisfaction
following punishment could have an impact on
people’s willingness to altruistically punish oth-
ers. In this sense, the push of anger could be
complemented possibly by a subsequent pull
of satisfaction. In other words, people may be
motivated to punish defectors by the satisfac-
tion they derive or expect to derive from im-
posing punishment upon them. For example,
most people seem to feel bad if they observe
that free riders are not punished and experi-
ence satisfaction if justice is established by pun-
ishing defectors.26,31,32 Moreover, research has
shown that punishment activates brain areas
related to reward processing33 and that feelings
of (righteous) satisfaction are augmented when
the suffering happens to someone who angered
them.31,32
Emotion is only elicited in response to a hu-
man interaction partner and not in response
to a computer interaction partner. Although in
both situations the offer could be perceived as
unfair, it is plausible that the computer part-
ner did not elicit anger and therefore the eval-
uation of unfairness alone was not sufficient
to use altruistic punishment. Sanfey and col-
leagues25 showed that unfair offers made by
human partners were rejected at a significantly
higher rate than those offers made by a com-
puter. The reduced willingness to reject an un-
fair offer upon applying TMS to the DLPFC
only applied to human interaction partners and
not to computer interaction partners.29 The
authors argue, based upon previous evidence,
that two fairness motives—reciprocity and in-
equity aversion—are simultaneously activated
in the human offer condition whereas only one
fairness motive—inequity aversion—is opera-
tive in the computer offer condition. Perhaps
an unequal offer by a computer is perceived
as unfair but does not elicit anger. In interper-
sonal interaction, you as a person have a cer-
tain intention and expect this intention to be
reciprocated by your partner. When this inten-
tion is not reciprocated, anger is elicited.34 In
support of this, Van ‘t Wout and colleagues24
showed that higher skin conductance responses
(a proximate for emotion) for unfair compared
Seip et al.: Role of Anger and Unfairness in Altruistic Punishment 195
to fair offers were only seen for human inter-
action partners. In investigating the hypothe-
sis that anger underlies altruistic punishment,
future research should take intentionality (for
both participant and interaction partner) and
reciprocity into account.
You expect another to treat you as you would
treat him and you perhaps experience more
intense emotions when this reciprocity is vio-
lated. The highlighted importance of intention
might, therefore, also relate to individual differ-
ences. People regarded as prosocial (e.g., being
concerned with an overall group norm, striv-
ing for equality, and trying to maximize joint
outcomes) are more likely to reciprocate their
partner’s action than proselves, who are more
motivated to maximize their own outcome.35
Other personality traits, such as regarding the
emotional reaction in response to a violation of
reciprocity (unfair behavior), might also influ-
ence the decision to use altruistic punishment.
Kassinove and colleagues36 showed that sub-
jects with high levels of trait anger made more
competitive/attack responses than did partic-
ipants with low levels of trait anger; this was
supported by our own results where partici-
pants primed with anger punished harder.30
Additional studies should take these individ-
ual differences into account because they can
provide interesting insights into the prevalence
of altruistic punishment among people.
Future research on the role of anger and the
perception of unfairness in altruistic punish-
ment could demonstrate whether the effect of
anger is unique or whether it is complemented
by, for example, (anticipated) satisfaction. In ad-
dressing contextual factors we can try to under-
stand when the perception of unfairness also
triggers anger. The results of these future in-
vestigations will allow us to obtain more de-
tails of the underlying mechanism of altruistic
punishment.
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